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. \.\ iN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
2·
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO

CASE NO. 312322
Plaintiff,

JUDGE SUSTER

v.

STATE'S MOTION TO
EXCLUDE TESTIMONY
OF DON MESTER

STATE OF OHIO,
Defendants.

The State of Ohio, by and through counsel, William D. Mason, Prosecuting
Attorney, Cuyahoga County, and Assistant Prosecutor Marilyn B. Cassidy, moves this
honorable court to exclude the testimony of Don Mester. The grounds for this motion are
that such testimony is improper rebuttal testimony, and in addition, is hearsay,
impermissible character evidence, and prejudicial, all as is set forth in the memorandum
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

Cassidy (001464
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-7785
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT

A. IMPROPER REBUTTAL
Rebuttal testimony is not for the purpose of bolstering a party's case in
chief.

A rebuttal witness can only provide testimony in response to new matters

introduced by a party opponent. See, Moore v. Retter (10 Dist. 1991), 72 Ohio App.3d
167, 174. The general rnle is that:
[a] party upon whom the affirmative of an issue rests is
bound to give all his evidence in support of the issue in the
first instance,and can only give such evidence in reply as
tends to rebut the new matter introduced by his opponent.
(emphasis added).

Id. at 174. See, also, Cities Service Oil Co. v. Burkett (l 964 ), 17 6 Ohio St. 449, 452
(stating that"[ u ]ndoubtedly, the proper time for the introduction of evidence in support of
a litigants' own case is during the introduction of his evidence in chief..."); Burke v.

Schaffner (10 Dist. 1996), 114 Ohio App.3d 655 (refusing to allow rebuttal witness to
testify since there was no "new" evidence to rebut). "A party upon whom the affirmative
of an issue rests is bound to give all his evidence in support of the issue in the first
instance, and can only give such evidence in reply as tends to rebut the new matter
introduced by his opponent." Burke v. Schaffner, (1966), 114 Ohio App.3d 655, 665.
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B.

THE TESTIMONY OF DON MESTER IS
HERESAY, VIOLATIVE OF EVID. R. 404, AND
PREJUDICIAL AND IS INADMISSIBHLE
EVIDENCE.

Plaintiff proposes to introduce through Mester, a statement allegedly made by
Richard Eberling. According to what has been represented by counsel for plaintiff, the
substance of the statement is that Mester, when arresting Eberling for the Durkin murder,
told him "you are being picked up for murder." Eberling's reply was something like
"What murder?" Or "How many murders am I being charged with?" Such testimony is
an out of court statement, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted and constitutes
inadmissible hearsay to which no exception applies. It is not a statement against interest.
Evid.R. 804 (B)(3) provides:
Statement against interest. A statement that was at the
time of its making contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or
proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant
to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement
unless the declarant believed it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability,
whether offered to exculpate or inculpate the accused, is
not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

The statement allegedly made by Eberling to Mester is not admissible as it is not
an incriminating remark, and no corroborating circumstances can be demonstrated.
There is no statement clearly against penal interest. A question by Eberling as to "what
murder" or "how many murders" fails to meet the requirement of 804(B)(3) in that it
does not "so far tends to subject the declarant to criminal liability" that a reasonable
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person would not have said it unless it were true. There is no way that Eberling could
have been criminally charged based on his question.

To the contrary, Eberling's

question/statement creates, at best, an ambiguity which fails to satisfy the rule.
Second, 804(B)(3) provides that such a statement is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
Containted within this requirement are significant hurdles which must be overcome by
the proponent of the statement. State v. Sumlin (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 105, citing U.S. v.
Salvador (C.A. 2, 1987), 820 F.2d 558. The statement will not be admissible unless

accompanied by "corroborating circumstances."

The corroboration must 'clearly

indicate' that the statement is trustworthy. Id.
In the

case herein,

there

are

absolutely no

circumstances

supporting

trustworthiness of the statement. Indeed, Eberling denied his guilt in the Durkin murder
all the way through the proceedings.

Accordingly, one can hardly surmise that he

admitted to the commission of a different homicide by asking a question at the time of his
arrest for the Durkin homicide.
C. EVID.R. 404 PROHIBITS THE INTRODUCTION
OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS.

Since the inception of this case, plaintiff has attempted to put into evidence the
notion that Richard Eberling is a serial killer. By order dated February 12, 2000, this
Court has already ruled that evidence of other alleged murders by Eberling is
inadmissible absent a showing of a nexus between them and the murder of Marilyn
Sheppard.
Evid. R. 404 states in pertinent part as follows:
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(A) Character Evidence Generally. Evidence of the person's
character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on
a particular occasion ....

***
(B) Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intend, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of
mistake or accident.
Admission of Eberling's hearsay statement is plaintiffs final attempt to introduce
impermissible character evidence relative to Richard Eberling.

Plaintiff hopes to

establish that in conformity with his supposed murderous propensities, he killed not only
Ethel Durkin, but others, as well.

As the State of Ohio has already addressed at some

length over the course of this proceeding, where conduct is not sufficiently distinctive to
demonstrate the identity of the perpetrator, other acts must be excluded. State v. Hall
(Cuy. App. 1989), 57 Ohio App. 3d 144. (Admission in a rape trial of evidence of two
earlier rapes committed by the defendant found to be error).
D.

THE TESTIMONY SHOULD BE EXCLUDED
UNDER EVID.R. 403.

Finally, the admission of Eberling's alleged statement to Mester is designed to
mislead and confuse the jury. After being unable to establish any nexus between the
murder of Marilyn Sheppard and the deaths of anyone else, the Sheppard estate seeks to
slip in the suggestion that Eberling may have committed several murders, as evidenced
by his question, "What murder?" Or "How many murders?" Eberling's alleged question
is enormously prejudicial and should be excluded .
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CONCLUSION
Mester's testimony constitutes hearsay to which no exception applies. There is no
statement against penal interest and no corroborating circumstances to insure
trustworthiness. Introduction of the statement is an effort on the part of plaintiff to put
impermissible character evidence before the jury in violation of Evid. R. 404. Finally,
the statement is designed to mislead and confuse the jury, is more prejudicial than
probative and inadmissible under Evid. R. 403.
Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM D. MASON, Prosecuting Attorney
of Cuyahoga County, Ohio

~---171
Marilyn Barkley Cassid (0014647)
A. Steven Dever (0024982)
Cuyahoga County Prosecutor's Office
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, Ohio 44113
(216) 443-5870
Attorneys for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of the foregoing Motion to Exclude Testimony of Don Mester was
served this

J5fr\ day of April, 2000, by hand delivery, upon Terry Gilbert, at Court

Room 20-B, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113.

M rilyn arkley Cassidy
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney

6

